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Kilian: In Defense of Anonymous Online Speech in Oklahoma

IN DEFENSE OF ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEECH IN
OKLAHOMA

The Internet is a democratic institution in the fullest sense. It serves as the modern
equivalent of Speakers' Corner in England's Hyde Park, where ordinary people may
voice their opinions, however silly, profane, or brilliant they may be to all who choose to
read them.1
The free exchange of ideas on the Internet is driven in large part by the ability of
Internet users to communicate anonymously. 2

1.

INTRODUCTION

Despite the many ways the Internet impacts our lives, some would argue that its
greatest value lies in strengthening democracy 3 by empowering individuals whose voice
might otherwise not be heard. It has been called the "greatest innovation in speech since
the invention of the printing press" 4 and a "unique democratizing medium unlike
anything that has come before." 5 The democratic nature of the Internet6 is at odds with
two types of litigation that have evolved over the past forty years: the strategic lawsuit
against public participation ("SLAPP") and its more recent digital offspring, the cyber
SLAPP.
A cyber SLAPP is a variation of a SLAPP, which was first identified and named 7
by Professors Penelope Canan and George W. Pring in a study published in 1988.8 They
described SLAPPs as "attempts to use civil tort action to stifle political expression." 9
The goal of a SLAPP is not to win the suit, but rather to "use litigation to intimidate

1. Notice of Motion by John Doe to Proceed Under Pseudonym and to Quash Deposition Subpoena
Directed to Yahoo!, Inc. and Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support Thereof at 3, Pre-Paid Legal
Servs. Inc. v. Sturtz (Super. Ct. for the Cnty. of Santa Clara 2001) (No. CV798295).
2. Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
3. Michael L. Best & Keegan W. Wade, The Internet and Democracy: Global Catalyst or Democratic
Dud?
(Berkman
Ctr.
Research
Publ'n
No.
2005-12),
available
at
http://cyber.Iaw.harvard.edu/publications/2005/Internet-and-Democracy GlobalCatalyst or Democratic Du
d.
4. Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Open Internet Access and Freedom of Speech: A First Amendment Catch-22,
75 TUL. L. REV. 87, 88 (2000).

5. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005).
6. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997).
7. Penelope Canan & George W. Pring, Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,35 SOC. PROBS.
506, 506 (1988).
8. Id.
9. Id.
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opponents' exercise of rights of petitioning and speech." 10 One court has characterized
SLAPPs as "generally meritless suits brought by large private interests to deter common
citizens from exercising their political or legal rights or to punish them for doing so." 11
Though the suits are often meritless, they nevertheless produce the intended effect of
chilling the defendant's rights to petition and to freedom of speech. 12
The Canan and Pring study identified four categories of factual bases1 3 under
which a SLAPP may arise, the most common being where one party's petition to the
government about a problem triggers a lawsuit by another party with an opposing
interest. 14 There are many different factual bases for the countless SLAPPs filed since
the study. 15 Many state legislatures have responded to the SLAPP phenomenon by
passing anti-SLAPP statutes.16 To date, twenty-seven states have passed some form of
anti-SLAPP statute, including Oklahoma. 17
The particular and recent variation of SLAPP that this comment will address is the
cyber SLAPP, the name given to a SLAPP when it arises not out of the defendant's
petition, but out of his anonymous online speech. The distinguishing feature of a cyber
SLAPP is that its goal is not only to silence the defendant but also to identify him. 19 One
example of a typical cyber SLAPP might progress as follows.20 An individual posts an
10. Duracraft Corp. v. Holmes Prods. Corp., 691 N.E.2d 935, 940 (Mass. 1998).
11. Wilcox v. Super. Ct., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 446, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
13. Canan & Pring,supra note 7, at 508-09.

14. Id. at 508.
15. See Equilon Enter. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685 (Cal. 2002) (where an oil company sued a
consumer group over its notice of intent to sue the company, and the court granted a consumer group's antiSLAPP motion to dismiss); Damon v. Ocean Hills Journalism Club, 102 Cal. Rptr. 2d 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000)
(where a former manager of a homeowner's association brought a defamation action against residents who
wrote an article critical of him, and the court granted the residents' motion to strike); Berryhill v. Ga. Cmty.
Support & Solutions, Inc., 638 S.E.2d 278 (Ga. 2006) (where a non-profit organization brought a tort action
against a mother who complained about services rendered by the organization to her son, and the court granted
her anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Melius v. Keiffer, 980 So. 2d 167 (La. Ct. App. 2008) (where a bar owner
filed suit against individuals who spoke out in opposition of a plan to construct a new bar, and the court granted
the individuals' motion to strike the petition); Baker v. Parsons, 750 N.E.2d 953 (Mass. 2001) (where a
property owner sued an individual who commented to state officials about the property owner's application to
construct a pier, and the court granted the individual's anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss); Maietta Const., Inc. v.
Wainwright, 847 A.2d 1169 (Me. 2004) (where a court dismissed a defamation action filed in response to a
resident's letters to city council under an anti-SLAPP statute).
16. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 - 12-752 (2009); ARK. CODE ANN. §§16-63-501 to 16-63-508
(2009); CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136 - 8138 (2009); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (2005); FLA. STAT. § 720.304(4) (2010); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to 634F-4 (2002); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 110/1 to 110/99 (2008); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1
to 34-7-7-10 (2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 556 (2008);
MD. CODE ANN. § 5-807 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231 § 59H (West 2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01
- 554.05 (2008); MO. REV. STAT. § 537.528 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21,241 to 25-21,246 (2008); NEV.
REV. STAT. §§ 41.635 - 41.670 (2008); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§38-2-9.1 to 38-2-9.2 (2008); N.Y. C.P.L.R.
3211(g) & 3212(h) (2009); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (2008); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 31.150 - 31.155 (2008);
27 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8301- 8305 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (2008); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 45-

24-67 (2008); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to 4-21-1004 (2009); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1401 to 78B6-1405 (2008); WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.520 (2008).
17. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (2008).
18. Press Release, cyberSLAPP.org, Privacy Groups Demand Protection of Users' Anonymity Online (July
11, 2002), availableat http://www.cyberslapp.org/DoePressRelease.cfm.
19. Id.
20. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001); Dendrite Int', Inc. v. Doe No.
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anonymous message on an online message board that is critical of another individual or
corporation.21 The target of the message files a lawsuit against the author for defamation
and then subpoenas the author's Internet service provider ("ISP") for information that
can be used to identify him.22 Some ISPs notify their customers before complying with
subpoenas but others may not.23 If the ISP complies with the subpoena before the author
can intervene then the author loses his constitutionally protected right to anonymous free
speech. 24
Anytime an individual decides to speak out anonymously online, someone may
have an interest in quieting the speaker.25 Anonymous online speech is a legitimate tool
that can be used for many beneficial purposes, such as whistle blowing,26 exposing
fraud, criticizing a public official,27 labor organization, or participating in political
movements. Many times, anonymity is a critical factor that allows the speaker to speak
freely when he otherwise might not, but empowering a speaker to speak freely also opens
the door to nefarious uses28 of anonymous online speech. Despite its positive uses, the
cloak of anonymity also removes the fear of reprisal for Internet users who choose to
harass and defame others.29 This comment will address how Oklahoma's courts and
legislature should balance the conflicting interests of the anonymous online speaker and
his target while giving due weight both to the speaker's right to remain anonymous and
the target's right to defend himself in the legal system. 3 0 As stated by one court, "the
right to communicate anonymously must be balanced against the need to assure that
those persons who choose to abuse the opportunities presented by this medium can be

3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
21. See cases cited supra note 20.
22. See cases cited supra note 20.
23. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1160 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (where ISP notified its
customer before complying with a subpoena). But see Corcept Therapeutics, Inc. v. Rothschild, 339 F. App'x
789, 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (where ISP did not notify its customer and plaintiff learned defendant's identity).
24. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The citations in this footnote support
the constitutionally protected right to anonymity assertion, but not the online portions.
25. See 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088; Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 454 (Del. 2005).
26. See George F. du Pont, The Time Has Come for Limited Liabilityfor Operators of True Anonymity
Remailers in Cyberspace: An Examination of the Possibilities and Perils, 6 J. TECH. L. & POCL'Y 175, 184
(2001).
27. At least one cyber-SLAPP has been filed in Oklahoma, although the plaintiff dismissed his case before
a decision was reached. See Burd v. Cole, No. CJ 2006-03717 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Crny. dismissed July 17,
2006). Burd was the superintendent of Sperry Public Schools and he alleged that the Cole and others slandered
him on an Internet message board. See Petition at 2-3, Burd v. Cole, No. CJ 2006-03717 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa
Cnty. June 13, 2006). He issued a subpoena to the defendants' ISP, which requested the identity of every
person registered at the message board. Notice of Subpoena Duces Tecum at 4, Burd v. Cole, No. CJ 200603717 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Tulsa Cnty. June 22, 2006). Burd dismissed the case following Cole's motion to quash
the subpoena, which argued that the subpoena should be quashed because it was overbroad and forced the
defendants to unnecessarily give up their anonymity. Motion to Quash by Anonymous Speakers and
Supporting Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 15, Burd v. Cole, No. CJ 2006-03717 (Okla. Dist. Ct.
Tulsa Cnty.). See also Burdv. Cole, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., http://www.eff.org/cases/burd-v-cole (last

visited Nov. 28, 2010).
28. du Pont, supra note 26, at 184.
29. See Jonathan D. Jones, Note, Cybersmears and John Doe: How, Far Should First Amendment
ProtectionofAnonymous Internet Speakers Extend?, 7 FIRST AMENDMENT L. REv. 421, 421 (2009) (describing
an incident where online anonymity was used to harass a female law student).
30. See infra Part IV.A.
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made to answer for such transgressions."31 Although there are no Oklahoma statutes32 or
cases directly on point, courts and legislatures in other jurisdictions are developing a
consensus 33 on how to balance these interests that can guide Oklahoma's approach. The
Oklahoma legislature should respond to this litigation trend proactively by expanding the
state's anti-SLAPP statute to protect its Internet users' First Amendment rights to
anonymous online speech.
Part 11 of this comment provides an overview of Supreme Court decisions that
have held that the First Amendment protects the right to anonymous speech. 34 Part 11
will also look at Supreme Court decisions that have held that the First Amendment
protects speech on the Internet in the same way as speech through any other medium. 35
Part III of this comment identifies and analyzes the different provisions of state antiSLAPP statutes and provides a look at cyber SLAPP cases from other jurisdictions. 36
Part III looks at how courts have applied existing anti-SLAPP laws to cyber SLAPP
cases 3 7 and concludes by finding which provisions best protect the cyber SLAPP
defendant. Part III also provides an overview of anti-SLAPP jurisprudence in Oklahoma
and discusses the limited applicability of Oklahoma's anti-SLAPP statute.38 Part IV of
this comment discusses the two key principles that courts have used to protect
defendants' anonymity.39 Part IV also analyzes the effect that ISP privacy policies can
have on anonymity in the absence of guidelines that regulate ISP compliance with civil
subpoenas seeking a defendant's identifying information.40 Finally, Part V of this
comment concludes by recommending how Oklahoma's anti-SLAPP statute could be
changed to reflect standards developing across the country.
11. THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS FOR PROTECTING ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEECH

A.

The Right to Speak Anonymously

Reformers throughout our country's history have long employed anonymous
speech as a tool to spread their messages. 4 1 The Constitution's original advocates argued

31. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, 6 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
32. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (2008) (the statute's limited range makes it practically inapplicable to
cyber-SLAPPs).
33. See Nathaniel Gleicher, Note, John Doe Subpoenas: Toward a Consistent Legal Standard, 118 YALE
L.J. 320, 325 (2008).
34. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
35. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
36. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001); Columbia Ins. Co. v.
seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2008); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001); America Online, 52 Va. Cir. 26.
37. See cases cited supra note 36.
38. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1. For a detailed analysis of this statutory section, see Laura Long, Note,
SlappingAround the FirstAmendment: An Analysis of Oklahoma s Anti-SLAPP Statute and its Implications on
the Right to Petition, 60 OKLA. L. REv. 419, 430-38 (2007).
39. See Krinsky, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 1171 (discussing the requirements of notice and a prima facie case).
40. See infra Part IV.B.
41. See Miguel E. Larios, ePublius:Anonymous Speech Rights Online, 37 RUTGERS L. REC. 36,37 (2010).
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for its ratification under the pseudonym Publius in the Federalist Papers.42 The Supreme
Court has consistently held that the First Amendment protects the right to speak
anonymously. 4 3 In Talley v. California,the Court examined the constitutionality of a Los
Angeles city ordinance that prohibited the distribution of any handbills under any
circumstances without giving the true name of the person who wrote or produced the
bill. 44 In holding that the ordinance unconstitutionally abridged freedom of speech, the
Court noted that anonymity has been used throughout history "for the most constructive
purposes" 45 and that anonymous pamphlets "have played an important role in the
progress of mankind."46 Anonymous speech is a constitutionally protected activity
because, as the Court recognized, identification of an author and his subsequent "fear of
reprisal" can "deter ... peaceful discussions" and thereby restrict freedom of speech. 4 7
In 1995, McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission presented the Supreme Court
with the issue of whether an Ohio law abridged freedom of speech by prohibiting the
anonymous distribution of campaign literature.48 The law in question prohibited the
publishing of any material advocating any issue without also publishing the name of the
author in a conspicuous place. 49 In McIntyre, Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to
attendees of a meeting to discuss a proposed school tax, which advocated that the
attendees vote against the tax. 50 The leaflets were signed "Concerned Parents and Tax
Payers." 5 1 Later, a school official who supported the tax filed a complaint with the Ohio
Elections Commission, asserting that the leaflets violated the law because they did not
identify the author.52 In holding that the law violated the First Amendment, the Court
pointed out that "anonymous pamphleteering is not a pernicious, fraudulent practice, but
an honorable tradition of advocacy and of dissent." 53 Although Ohio had argued that the
law was a valid attempt to prevent fraudulent and libelous statements 54 and to inform the
electorate, 55 the Court found the prohibition on all anonymous pamphleteering too broad
to serve those objectives.56 While recognizing that the state does have an interest in
preventing fraud and libel, especially during an election, 57 the Court balanced the state's
interest with the individual's interest in free expression by recognizing that "our society
accords greater weight to the value of free speech than to the dangers of its misuse." 58
42. See generally Gregory E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to the FederalistPapersas a Source of the Original
Meaning of the United States Constitution,87 B.U. L. REv. 801 (2007).
43. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 205 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995); Talleyv. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960).
44. Talley, 362 U.S. at 61.
45. Id. at 65.
46. Id. at 64.
47. Id at 65.
48. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 336.
49. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3599.09(A) (1988), invalidatedby McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334.
50. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 337.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 338.
53. Id at 357.
54. Id. at 348.
55. Id.
56. Id at 351.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 357.
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The most recent U.S. Supreme Court decision vindicating the right to anonymous
speech is the 1999 case Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, which
focused on the restrictions that three Colorado statutes placed on circulators of initiativepetitions.59 Colorado allows its citizens to make laws directly by placing initiatives on
election ballots.60 The laws in question in this case required an individual who circulated
a petition in favor of a given initiative to be a registered voter61 and to wear an
identification badge showing his or her name.62 A third statute required that the backers
of the initiative produce a report containing the names and addresses of paid
circulators.63 The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit's judgment that all three
statutes violated the First Amendment right to free speech. 64
The Court placed weight on the testimony at trial from several organizers as to the
effect that the identification requirement had on participation.65 Testimony from one
organizer stated that the badge requirement "limited the number of people willing to
work" as circulators.66 Others testified that people were not willing to work as
circulators if they had to wear identification badges because "it [made] them afraid" and
they were reluctant to face "recrimination and retaliation." 67 In holding the identification
requirement unconstitutional, the Court found that the restraint on speech was "more
severe than was the restraint in McIntyre"68 and that forcing circulators to identify
themselves "discourages participation in the petition circulation process." 69
Discovery of an anonymous defendant's identity in a cyber SLAPP case defeats
the same principles that these cases upheld. 70 The Court's recognition in both Talley and
Buckley that fear of reprisal can produce a chilling effect on freedom of expression71 is
exactly the principle that should protect cyber SLAPP defendants. In order to assure the

greatest possible participation in the public process, it is necessary to protect the
individual's right to participate anonymously.72 This is no less true with regard to
participation on the Internet than it is with regard to participation in an election issue or a
ballot initiative. 73 As in McIntyre, where there is no suggestion that "[speech is] false,
misleading, or libelous," 74 Internet users should feel free to exercise their rights to
anonymous speech without fearing that they will later be identified.
59. Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 186 (1999).
60. Id.
61. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(1) (1998), invalidatedby Buckley, 525 U.S. 182.
62. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-112(2) (1998), invalidatedby Buckley, 525 U.S. 182.
63. COLO. REV. STAT. § 1-40-121 (1998), invalidatedby Buckley, 525 U.S. 182.
64. Buckley, 525 U.S. at 187.
65. Id. at 198.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 199.
69. Id. at 200.
70. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1162 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (recognizing that "[t]he use of
a pseudonymous screen name offers a safe outlet for the user to . . . express unorthodox political views ...
without fear of intimidation or reprisal").
71. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 65 (1960); Buckley, 525 U.S. at 198-200.
72. See Talley, 362 U.S. at 64.
73. See ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230-31 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (listing the reasons people may have
to participate online anonymously).
74. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 337 (1995).
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The Right to Speak Anonymously Online

As the cases above demonstrated, it is well established that the First Amendment's
protection of free of speech extends to the right to speak anonymously, 75 but whether
that protection extends to speaking online was not always clear. As Internet use became
more widespread in the 1990's,76 the U.S. Supreme Court addressed for the first time the
extent of First Amendment protections that the new medium would enjoy in Reno v.
ACLU. 77
In Reno, the issue before the court was the constitutionality of two provisions of
the Communications Decency Act of 1996, by which lawmakers intended to protect
minors from "indecent" and "patently offensive" online communications. 79 Section
223(a) of the Act prohibited the "knowing transmission of obscene or indecent messages
to any recipient under 18 years of age," 80 while section 223(d) prohibited transmitting
such materials "in a manner that is available to a person under 18 years of age." 81 The
American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU"), joined by nineteen other plaintiffs, 82
challenged the constitutionality of the provisions on the grounds that they were
overbroad.83 In affirming the district court's holding that the statute was
unconstitutional,84 the Court distinguished the Internet as a medium from the broadcast
media.85 The "invasive,"86 one-way nature of the broadcast media is such that the court
has recognized that it may be subject to "special justifications for regulation ... that are
not applicable to other speakers." By contrast, the Internet does not share this invasive
nature; a user must take "a series of affirmative steps" to access any given Internet
communication. Therefore, the Court found that, unlike the broadcast media, with
respect to the Internet there is "no basis for qualifying the level of First Amendment
scrutiny that should be applied to this medium."89
After Reno, the Internet medium can fairly be regarded as analogous to the print
media with respect to First Amendment protections and limitations on speech. 90 As
shown in ACLU v. Miller,9 1 the protection of anonymous speech through the Internet
75. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Talley,
362 U.S. 60.
76. See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 850 (1997) (detailing the growth of Internet use between 1981 and
1996).
77. Reno, 521 U.S. 844.
78. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a)(1)(B), 223(d) (1994 ed. Supp. II), invalidatedbyReno, 521 U.S. at 885.
79. Reno, 521 U.S. at 849.
80. Id at 859.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 861.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 885.
85. Id. at 868.
86. Id at 869 (internal quotation marks omitted).
87. Id. at 868.
88. Id. at 867.
89. Id. at 870.
90. Protections of speech through print media under the First Amendment are outside the scope of this
comment. See generally Khaldoun Shobaki, Note, Speech Restraintsfor Converged Media, 52 UCLA L. REV.
333, 342 (2004).
91. ACLU v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
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medium is no exception.92 In Miller, the ACLU filed a lawsuit that asked the court to
enjoin the state of Georgia from enforcing a statute that made it a crime for "any
person ... to transmit any data through a computer network ... if such data ... falsely
[identifies] the person." 93 The ACLU argued that the statute unconstitutionally restricted
the "right to communicate anonymously and pseudonymously over the Internet," 94 and
that the broad language of the act "allows for selective prosecution of persons
communicating about controversial topics." 95
The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, holding that
the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their claims that the statute was overbroad and
unconstitutionally vague.96 It recognized that although the purpose of the statute was to
prevent fraud, 97 the statute's wide range could "sweep[] innocent, protected speech
within its scope." 98 The protected speech to which the court referred includes "the use of
false identification to avoid social ostracism, to prevent discrimination and harassment,
and to protect privacy,"99 all of which are "legitimate and important reasons for
concealing" 1oo one's identity online.
Ill. STATE ANTI-SLAPP LAWS AND THEIR APPLICATION TO CYBER-SLAPP CASES

A.

State Anti-SLAPP Laws

As Part 11 shows, anonymous online speech is a constitutionally protected
activity 10 1 subject only to the limitations imposed on speech through print media, such
as the limitation on protection of libelous or defamatory speech.102 Society traditionally
places greater weight on the benefits derived from free speech than the detriments that
may result from the exercise thereof. 10 3 Many states have codified this principle by

enacting anti-SLAPP statutes to protect the legitimate exercise of First Amendment
rights from the chilling effects of strategic, retaliatory litigation.104 Anti-SLAPP statutes
have proven to be an effective means of preventing such litigation, and in some cases
courts have applied those statutes to protect online speech.1 05
Courts have likely applied California's anti-SLAPP statute more often than that of
any other state.106 It was enacted in 1992 to respond to a "disturbing increase
m

92. See id at 1235.
93. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-93.1 (West 1996), invalidatedby Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1235.
94. Miller, 977 F. Supp. at 1230.
95. Id. at 1231.
96. Id. at 1232.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1233.
100. Id. at 1234.
101. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228.
102. See supra note 90.
103. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995).
104. See sources cited supra note 16.
105. See Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d. 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
106. During the time this article was written, a Westlaw search revealed 2,302 notes of decisions for CAL.
CIV. PROC. CODE §425.16.
107. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2009).
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litigation aimed at chilling legitimate speech, and courts have applied it to cyber-SLAPP
cases. 108 The statute provides that any cause of action initiated against a defendant due
to his exercise of the "right of petition" or right to "free speech ... in connection with a
public issue" is "subject to a special motion to strike," unless the plaintiff can show a
likelihood that he will prevail on the claim. 109 In considering the motion in the context
of a defamation claim, a California court must first determine whether the defendant
spoke in connection with a public issue,110 and then consider the pleadings and any
affidavits to determine the plaintiff s likelihood of success.111
For the cyber-SLAPP defendant wishing to remain anonymous, the critical
provision of California Civil Procedure section 425.16 is the special motion to strike, the
filing of which initiates a stay on all discovery proceedings until the court rules on the
motion.112 If the defendant files a special motion to strike early enough, a stay on
discovery precludes the plaintiff from gaining the defendant's identifying information
via a subpoena to the defendant's ISP. 113
Aside from California and Oklahoma, twenty-five other states have anti-SLAPP
statutes. 114 Of those, eleven states have provisions similar to California that require the
defendant to speak on an issue of public concern before invoking the protection of the
statutes.115 Eleven states also allow the defendant to file a special motion to strike or a
motion to dismiss,1 16 but of those eleven, only eight provide for a stay of discovery. 17
Subject to varying conditions, all eleven states that allow a special motion to strike or
dismiss shift the burden to the plaintiff to prove that his action has a substantial basis in
law in order to save his case.118

108. Global Telemedia, 132 F. Supp. 2d. 1261.
109. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West 2009).
110. See D.C. v. R.R., 106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (denying defendant's motion to strike
made under CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 on the grounds that threatening speech made online by one
student to another was not protected speech and not in connection with a public issue).
111. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(2) (West 2009).
112. § 425.16(g).
113. See Corcept Therapeutics, Inc. v. Rothschild, 339 F. App'x 789, 790 (9th Cir. 2009) (where defendant
did not file special motion to strike in time and plaintiff obtained his IP address through discovery).
114. See sources cited supranote 16.
115. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136 - 8138 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11 -11.1 (West 2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to 634F-4 (2002); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to 34-7-7-10 (2008); LA. CODE CIv. PROC.
ANN. art. 971 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 59H
(West 2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 - 554.05 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241 - 25-21, 246 (2008);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g); 3212(h) (McKINNEY 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (2008).
116. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136 - 8138 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to 634F-4 (2002); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to 34-7-7-10 (2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 971 (2008); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 59H
(West 2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 - 554.05 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241 - 25-21, 246 (2008);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g); 3212(h) (McKINNEY 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (2008).
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2008); HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to 634F-4 (2002); IND. CODE
§§ 34-7-7-1 to 34-7-7-10 (2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2008); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, §
556 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 59H (West 2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 - 554.05 (2008);
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (2008).
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136 - 8138 (West 2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (West 2008); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 634F-1 to 634F-4 (2002); IND. CODE §§ 34-7-7-1 to 34-7-7-10 (2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
ANN. art. 971 (2008); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2008); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 231, § 59H
(West 2008); MINN. STAT. §§ 554.01 - 554.05 (2008); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 25-21, 241 - 25-21, 246 (2008);
N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g); 3212(h) (McKINNEY 2009); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to 9-33-4 (2008).
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While Oklahoma does not have a statute that is truly analogous to the anti-SLAPP
statutes described above, the Oklahoma statute that is considered to be an anti-SLAPP
statutell9 is section 1443.1 of Title 12.120 Section 1443.1 was passed in 1981, seven
years before Canan and Pring identified SLAPPs as a growing problem.121 On its face,
the entire scope of the statute is to classify certain types of communications as privileged
and then to exempt those communications from a single cause of action, libel.122 Under
the statute, privileged communications include those made either in a judicial or
legislative proceeding, or during the discharge of an official duty.1 23 Also privileged are
any fair and true reports of judicial or legislative proceedings or any other proceeding
authorized by law, any opinions of those proceedings, and any criticism of the official
acts of a public officer, with the exception of falsely imputing a crime to that officer. 124
Though the statute's scope is limited, it reflects a principle recognized long ago by
the Oklahoma Supreme Court that "[e]very one has a right to comment on matters of
public interest and concern" 12 5 so long as they do so in "good faith" 12 6 and "without
malice."127 To those ends, Oklahoma courts have interpreted section 1443.1 liberally;
for example, for the purpose of the statutory privilege, a "fair and true report"128 might
contain "[s]light inaccuracies of expression ... provided that the defamatory charge is
true in substance." 129 A statement made in a "judicial proceeding" 130 includes a
statement made in an affidavit. 13 1 A newspaper editorial that criticized a group's efforts
to argue for tort reform was held privilegedl32 as "any other proceeding authorized by
law." 133 The statutory privilege does not protect false statements, but statements of
opinion are protected because they "are incapable of being false." 134
In addition to the statutory privilege, Oklahoma also recognizes a common law fair

comment defense to a defamation action that applies to comments made on issues of
"public concern," based on "true facts," which are the "actual opinion of the speaker."1 35

119. See Long, supra note 38, at 431; Geoffrey Paul Huling, Tired of Being Slapped Around: States Take
Action Against Lawsuits Designed to Intimidate and Harass,25 RUTGERS L.J. 401, 418 n.76 (1994); Shaun B.
Spencer, Cyberslapp Suits and John Doe Subpoenas: BalancingAnonymiy and Accountability in Cyberspace,
19 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 493, 500 n.61 (2001); Rebecca Ariel Hoffberg, The Special Motion
Requirements of the Massachusetts Anti-SLAPP Statute: A Real Slap in the Facefor TraditionalCivil Practice
and Procedure, 16 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 97, 127 n.192 (2006).
120. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (2008).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Holway v. World Pub. Co., 44 P.2d 881, 886 (Okla. 1935) (citing Bearce v. Bass, 34 A. 411, 412, 413
(Me. 1896)).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,

§ 1443.1

(2008).

129. McGhee v. Newspaper Holdings, Inc., 115 P.3d 896, 898 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (quotations and
citations omitted).
130. OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,

§ 1443.1

(2008).

131. Joplin v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 753 F.2d 808, 810 (10th Cir. 1983).
132. Gaylord Entm't Co. v. Thompson, 958 P.2d 128, 146 (Okla. 1998).
133.

OKLA. STAT. tit. 12,

§ 1443.1

(2008).

134. Hennessee v. Mathis, 737 P.2d 958, 962 (Okla. Civ. App. 1987).
135. Sturgeon v. Retherford Publ'ns, Inc., 987 P.2d 1218, 1225 n.4 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999).
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While Oklahoma courts have often invoked both the statutory and common law
privileges to protect a defendant's legitimate speech, these protections are inadequate for
the cyber-SLAPP defendant due to the substantial harml36 that is inflicted when the
defendant is wrongly stripped of his anonymity. The statutory protection is also
inadequate in that it only applies to libel causes of action, while cyber-SLAPPs have
been filed under several different causes of action, including business torts and
conspiracy. 137 Instead of providing the defendant with procedural shortcuts to identify
meritless suits, shifting the burden to the plaintiff, and preserving the defendant's
anonymity, Oklahoma law would force the defendant to incur the time and expense of
defending the meritless suit in court. 13 8
B.

Anti-SLAPP Laws Applied to Cyber-SLAPP Cases

One example of an anti-SLAPP statute applied to a cyber-SLAPP case is Global
Telemedia International, Inc. v. Doe 1.139 In Global Telemedia, Global Telemedia
International, Inc. ("GTMI") sued Defendants King and Reader over allegedly libelous
comments that each defendant made about GTMI on an Internet message board.140 King
and Reader argued that GTMI brought the case against them in an attempt to "intimidate
and silence" critics of the company, 14 1 and King and Reader brought separate motions to
strike under California's anti-SLAPP statute, California Civil Procedure section
425.16.142
The state of California passed section 425.16 with an eye towards encouraging
"participation in matters of public significance"'143 and preventing such participation
from being "chilled through abuse of the judicial process.'144 Section 425.16 gives a
defendant the ability to file a special motion to strike when the lawsuit against him
comes as a result of his "free speech 'in connection with a public issue." 145 Under
section 425.16, if the defendant can show that his speech was indeed in connection with
a public issue, "the burden shifts to [the] plaintiff to [either] demonstrate a probability of
success,"146 or have his lawsuit dismissed.
Section 425.16(e) provides that free speech exercised in connection with a public
issue includes "any written or oral statement or writing made in a place open to the
136. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 459 (Del. 2005).
137. See Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1159 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008) (where the plaintiff s causes
of action included "intentional interference with a 'contractual and/or business employment relationship' ...
libel, . . . fraud, improper professional conduct, and criminal activity to plaintiff'); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe
No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 759-60 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (where the plaintiffs causes of action included
"breach of employment or confidentiality agreements; breach of fiduciary duty; misappropriation of trade
secrets; interference with a prospective business advantage; defamation; and other causes of action").
138. See Erin Malia Lum, Note, Hawaii'sResponse to Strategic LitigationAgainst PublicParticipationand
the Protection of Citizens' Right to Petition the Government, 24 U. HAW. L. REv. 411, 416 (2001) (describing
the cost of defending meritless lawsuits).
139. Global Telemedia Int'l, Inc. v. Doe 1, 132 F. Supp. 2d. 1261 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
140. Id. at 1264.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE

§ 425.16(a)).

144. Id. (quoting CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(a)).
145. Id. at 1265.
146. Id. at 1266.
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public or a public forum in connection with an issue of public interest." 147 Here, GTMI
was a publicly traded company with nearly 18,000 investors. 148 The message board in
question had over 30,000 messages devoted to GTMI.1 49 Both of these facts weighed
heavily on the court's determination that King and Reader's postings were in fact in
connection with a public issue. 150
After the court determined that the comments at issue were in connection with a
public issue, the burden shifted to GTMI to show a probability of success on the
merits.151 Ultimately, the court agreed with King and Reader's argument that the
comments in question "were opinion[s]." 152 The court also agreed with King and
Reader's argument that "opinions are not actionable under either trade libel or libel per
se," 153 and granted both King's and Reader's motions to strike. 154
C.

When Should John Doe be Unmasked?

Courts in other jurisdictions have gained experience in handling cyber SLAPP
cases.155 The central issue in each of the following cases is how the court should balance
the defendant's First Amendment interest in anonymous online speech with the
plaintiffs interest in identifying the defendant so that he may seek relief for an alleged
wrong.156 Courts have struggled with this issue since 1999, when the court in Columbia
Insurance Co. v. seescandy.com established one of the first standards for unmasking an
anonymous online defendant. 157 In seescandy.com, Columbia Insurance Company
("Columbia") sued the unidentified defendants who registered the seescandy.com
domain name for various claims relating to trademark infringement.158 The record
showed that the names and contact information for the owners of seescandy.com had
changed several times in the months preceding the lawsuit. 159 Due to its inability to
determine the true owner of the allegedly infringing website and its inability to serve that
person with the complaint, Columbia sought the court's permission to determine the
plaintiff s identity through discovery. 160
The court issued a four-part standard to govern whether the pre-service use of
discovery to determine the defendant's identity is appropriate.161 It held that Columbia

147. Id. at 1265.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1266.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 1266-67, 1270.
155. See Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001); Columbia Ins. Co. v.
seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008); Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2001); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
156. See, e.g., 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088; Cahill, 884 A.2d 451.
157. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573.
158. Id. at 576.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 577.
161. Id. at 578-80.
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must: (1) provide enough information for the court to determine that the defendant is a
person who can be served in federal court; 162 (2) identify all steps previously taken to
locate the defendant;163 (3) demonstrate that its suit could withstand a motion to
dismiss;164 and (4) establish that there is a reasonable likelihood that the information
sought through discovery will lead to identifying the defendant.165 While the court
recognized that "[p]eople who have committed no wrong should be able to participate
online"l66 without fear of having their identities exposed through frivolous lawsuits, the
motion to dismiss standard that it gave for identifying defendants would prove to be
weak in comparison to the standard applied by later courts. 16 7
The court in in re Subpoena Duces Tecum to America Online, Inc. gave another
early standard for identifying anonymous defendants.168 In America Online, Anonymous
Publicly Traded Company ("ATPC") filed suit against five John Does. 169 ATPC alleged
that the Does were current or former employees who made defamatory statements about
ATPC and released confidential information about ATPC in an America Online ("AOL")
chat room. 170 Four of the Does were AOL subscribers, and ATPC obtained a court order
compelling AOL to "produce any and all documents from which the identity of the four
AOL subscribers could be ascertained." 171 AOL was unwilling to comply with the
subpoena out of concern for its customers' First Amendment rights, and asked the court
to quash the subpoena. 172
In denying AOL's motion to quash, the court developed a two-part test for whether
to force an ISP to identify its customer: (1) whether, on the basis of evidence or
pleadings, the party requesting the subpoena demonstrates a good faith basis for his
claim; and (2) whether the "subpoenaed identity information is centrally needed to
advance that claim." 173 While both the America Online court and the seescandy.com
court expressed concern about the strength of the plaintiff's claim and the relevance of
the information sought,174 the America Online court required only that a plaintiff have a
good faith basis for his claim before the court would force identification of the
defendant.175 A later court rejected the American Online court's good faith standard,
which is an even weaker standard than the seescandy.com court's motion to dismiss
standard, because it "offers no practical, reliable way to determine the plaintiffs good

162. Id. at 578.
163. Id. at 579.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 580.
166. Id. at 578.
167. See, e.g., Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005) (promulgating a stronger, summary judgment
standard).
168. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2000).
169. Id. at 1.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 2.
173. Id. at 8.
174. Columbia Ins. Co. v. seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999); America Online, Inc., 52 Va.
Cir. 26.
175. America Online, Inc., 52 Va. Cir. 26, at 8.
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faith and leaves the speaker with little protection.',176
In 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington issued an
often-cited order in Doe v. 2TheMart.com. 177 This matter came before the Washington
court on Doe's motion to quash a subpoena stemming from 2TheMart.com's ("TMRT")
defense of a shareholder's derivative suit in the Central District of California.178 The two
issues for the Washington court to decide were: first, whether Doe could proceed under a
pseudonym,179 and second, whether the court should grant Doe's motion to quash
TMRT's subpoena.180 TMRT served a subpoena to Seattle-based Internet service
provider InfoSpace, Inc. that sought identifying information for twenty-three anonymous
participants, including Doe, who participated on an Internet message board operated by
InfoSpace. 18 1
TMRT issued the subpoena as part of its defense to the California shareholder's
derivative suit.182 In response to the plaintiff-shareholders' allegation that fraud on the
market caused TMRT's falling stock price,183 one of TMRT's affirmative defenses was
that it was not the cause of the falling stock price. 184 TMRT's theory was that Doe and
the other anonymous users of the message board caused the stock price to fall through
their postings.185 In support of that defense, it issued the subpoena at issue to
InfoSpace. 18 6
InfoSpace operated a website called Silicon Investor, which was a collection of
online message boards on which users could discuss various publicly traded companies,
including TMRT.187 The TMRT message board contained nearly 1,500 messages posted
by users using pseudonyms, some of which were highly critical of the company.188
TMRT's subpoena to InfoSpace sought "among other things, '[a]ll identifying
information and documents, including, but not limited to, computerized or computer
stored records and logs, [email], and postings on your online message boards,"' which
would be used to identify Doe and the other twenty-two users.189 TMRT subpoenaed
this information on the theory that the twenty-three users were the cause of TMRT's
falling stock price because the users "'manipulated the [TMRT] stock price using the
Silicon Investor message boards."' 190 When InfoSpace received the subpoena, it notified
the users that their identifying information was the subject of a subpoena, which gave
Doe time to file a motion to quash. 19 1
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.

Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1167 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1089 (W.D. Wa. 2001).
Id.at 1089.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 1090.
See id.
at1089.
Id.at 1097.
Id.at 1090.
Id.at 1097.
Id.at 1090.
Id.
Id.
Id. (quoting TMRT's subpoena to InfoSpace).
Id. at 1095 (quoting TMRT's complaint).
Id. at 1091.
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The court recognized that the constitutional implications of TMRT's request
required careful balancing of the broad rules of discovery against Internet users' right to
communicate anonymously.192 The court developed a four-factor test for determining
whether to grant a motion to quash a civil subpoena when the subpoena seeks to uncover
the identity of an anonymous Internet user who is not a party to the underlying
litigation.193 The court gives weight to each factor "as the court determines is
appropriate under the circumstances of each case." 194 First, the court looks at whether
the subpoena was "issued in good faith." 195 Second, whether "the information sought
relates to a core claim or defense." 19 6 Third, whether the "identifying information is
directly and materially relevant to that claim or defense." 197 Finally, whether
"information sufficient to establish or to disprove that claim or defense is unavailable
from any other source." 1 98
In applying the four-factor test to Doe's motion, the court found that although the
subpoena was not necessarily brought in bad faith, 199 the information the subpoena
sought did not "relate to a core defense." 200 Further, since TMRT did not know the
identities of Doe and the other users when they posted their messages, Doe and the other
users' identifying information could not have related to TMRT's core defense that the
users posted the messages in order to manipulate TMRT's stock price.201 The court also
weighed the fourth factor in favor of Doe, finding that TMRT did not show that it could
not obtain the information it needed to establish its defense from another source.202
Since each of the four factors weighed against TMRT, the court granted Doe's motion to
quash the subpoena. 203
2TheMart.com remains an influential case for courts confronting the delicate
balance of interests presented in cyber SLAPP cases.204 Several state and federal courts
have applied, in whole or in part, the 2TheMart.com court's standard for whether to
quash a civil subpoena when it seeks to identify an anonymous non-party Internet
user. 205 As the court pointed out in 2TheMart.com, the standard for identifying a nonparty Internet user must be more stringent than the standard for identifying an Internet
user who is a party to the underlying litigation.206
In 2005, the Supreme Court of Delaware issued standards for identifying an

192. See id. at 1093.
193. Id. at 1095.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1096.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1097.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 1098.
204. See 2TheMart com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088.
205. See, e.g., Enterline v. Pocono Med. Ctr., 751 F. Supp. 2d 782, 787 (M.D. Pa. 2008); Sedersten v.
Taylor, No. 09-3031-CV-S-GAF, 2009 WL 4802567, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 9, 2009).
206. 2TheMart com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1095.
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anonymous defendant through discovery in Doe v. Cahill.2 07 In Cahill, an anonymous
Internet user, Doe, posted comments on a blog that were critical of Patrick Cahill, a city
councilman in Smyrna, Delaware, where both parties resided.208 Specifically, two of
Doe's comments were the subject of the ensuing action for defamation and invasion of
privacy,209 and both comments related to Cahill's performance in his capacity as a city
councilman.210 In order to identify Doe, Cahill deposed the blog's owner and found that
Comcast owned the IP address associated with Doe's comments.211 The court's
explanation of an Internet user's IP address, as it relates to his anonymity, is instructive.
An IP address is an electronic number that specifically identifies a
particular computer using the internet. IP addresses are often owned by
internet service providers who then assign them to subscribers when
they use the internet. These addresses are unique and assigned to only
one ISP subscriber at a time. Thus, if the ISP knows the time and the
date that postings were made from a specific IP address, it can
determine the identity of its subscriber. 212
After Cahill obtained Doe's IP address, he secured a court order that required
Comcast to reveal Doe's identity.213 At the time, there was a federal statute214 in place
that prohibited an ISP from disclosing its subscribers "personally identifiable
information" 2 15 unless the disclosure was made "pursuant to a court order"216 and the
subscriber was "notified of such order." 217 In this case, Comcast complied with the
statute by notifying Doe of the court order, which gave Doe time to file a motion for a
protective order to preserve his anonymity. 2 18 The trial court denied Doe's motion while
accepting Cahill's argument that he should only have to demonstrate a "good faith basis"
for his defamation claim before Comcast should be required to identify Doe.219 The
Supreme Court of Delaware accepted Doe's interlocutory appeal of the trial court's
order. 220 The issue on appeal was whether the trial court's good faith standard
207. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451 (Del. 2005).
208. Id. at 454.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 454-55.
213. Id. at 455.
214. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c) (West 2001). But see In re Application of the United States of America for an
Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(D) Directed to Cablevision Sys. Corp., 158 F. Supp. 2d 644, 648 (D. Md.
2001) (holding that the provision of 47 U.S.C.A § 551 requiring a cable company to notify a subscriber that the
cable company was ordered by a court to release the subscriber's personally identifiable information was
"implicitly repealed" when Congress subsequently passed an inconsistent provision in The Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, which specifically bars a cable company from providing such notice to
subscribers provided certain conditions are met). See also The Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18
U.S.C.A § 2705(b) (West 2001).
215. 47 U.S.C.A. § 551(c) (West 2001).
216. Id. § 551(c)(2)(B).
217. Id.
218. Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 455 (Del. 2005).
219. Cahill v. Jon Doe-Number One, 879 A.2d 943, 945 (Del. Super. Ct. 2005).
220. Cahill,884 A.2d at 455.
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"appropriately balance[d] [Doe's] right to speak anonymously against [Cahill's] right to
protect his reputation."221
The good faith standard applied by the trial court is a low standard.222 To satisfy
the trial court's good faith standard, a plaintiff must establish only a "good faith basis"
for his claim, that the information he seeks is "directly and materially related to [the]
claim," and that the information cannot be "obtained from any other source." 223
Applying such a standard could result in a defendant's loss of anonymity when the
plaintiff s defamation claim is "not very strong."224 To allow defendants to be unmasked
so easily "discourage[s] debate on important issues of public concern,"225 and the Cahill
court worried that the standard would "chill potential posters from exercising their First
Amendment right to speak anonymously." 226
The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the trial court's denial of Doe's motion
for protective order with instructions to dismiss the plaintiff s claim with prejudice. 227In
doing so, it adopted a summary judgment standard for unmasking an anonymous
defendant.228 The summary judgment standard that the court adopted was a modified
version of a standard created by a New Jersey appellate court in Dendrite International
Inc. v. Doe. 22 9
The facts in Dendrite were very similar to the facts in Cahill, except that the target
of the Dendrite defendant's anonymous online criticism was a corporation rather than a
city councilman. 230 The Dendrite court required that, in order to force identification of
an anonymous defendant, a plaintiff first must attempt to notify the defendant that his
identifying information is being subpoenaed, and thereby provide him a chance to
oppose the subpoena.231 The plaintiff must then "set forth the exact statements" made by
the defendant and present a "prima facie cause of action" for defamation. 2 32 Before
allowing the plaintiff to proceed, the court must weigh the "strength of the prima facie
case presented" against the defendant's "First Amendment right of anonymous free
speech." 233
After discussing the Dendrite standard, the Cahill court adopted a modified
standard for unmasking anonymous defendants.234 Under Cahill, a plaintiff who wishes
to identify an anonymous defendant must attempt to "notify the anonymous poster that
he is the subject of a subpoena or application for order of disclosure."235 When a case
arises in the context of the Internet, this notification provision also requires a plaintiff to
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.
226.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id. at 456.
See id. at 457.
Id. at 455.
Id. at 457.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 468.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 461.
Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 761 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
Id. at 760.
Id.
Id. at 760-61.
Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 461 (Del. 2005).
Id. at 460.
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post a message in the same place as the allegedly defamatory comments that notifies the
"anonymous defendant of the plaintiff s discovery request."236 Second, the plaintiff must
satisfy the summary judgment standard237 by submitting "sufficient evidence to establish
a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in question."238
Underlying the Cahill court's decision to adopt a more stringent standard than the
one applied by the trial court was a recognition of the potential value of anonymous
online speech. 239 Such speech allows the speaker to speak to a large and diverse
audience240 while knowing that her ideas will be evaluated "on her words alone."241 Not
only is this form of speech constitutionally protected, but it has a positive effect on
public debate242 and in some cases "can become the modern equivalent of political
pamphleteering." 243
The 2008 California case Krinsky v. Doe 6 considered each of the above standards
when it decided whether a subpoena to Yahoo! should be quashed. Krinsky, who was the
president of a Florida company, alleged that Doe 6 and others made defamatory
statements about Krinsky on a Yahoo! message board, and served a subpoena to Yahoo!
that requested identifying information about the defendants. 244 Yahoo! notified the
defendants of the subpoena, which gave the defendants time to file a motion to quash on
First Amendment grounds.245 The trial court denied the motion to quash and Doe 6
appealed. 24 6
In trying to balance the interests of both parties, the court provided a thorough
discussion of each different standard from above.247 It immediately foreclosed the
possibility of applying the America Online standard because it provides such a "low
threshold for disclosure." 248 While the Dendrite standard applies "greater scrutiny [to]
the plaintiffs cause of action,"249 the Krinsky court declined to expressly adopt the
Dendrite standard.250 The court agreed with the Cahill court that the Dendrite
requirement that the defendant himself notify the plaintiff of the pending subpoena was
"unrealistic" due to the possibility that the forum on which the comment was made "may
no longer exist . . . by the time the plaintiff brings suit." 25 1 However, the Krinsky court

236. Id. at 461.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 463 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Colgain v. Oy-Partek Ab (In re Asbestos Litig.), 799 A.2d 1151,
1152 (Del. 2002).
239. See id. at 455.
240. Id. (quoting Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation & Discourse in Cyberspace, 49
DUKE L.J. 855, 895 (2000)).
241. Id. at 456 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
242. See id.
243. Id.
244. Krinsky v. Doe 6, 159 Cal. App. 4th 1154, 1159-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
245. Id. at 1160.
246. Id. at 1160-61.
247. Id. at 1167.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 1171.
251. Id.
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agreed with Cahill and Dendrite in
Oklahoma's approach.
IV.

A.

two

key

aspects2 52 that

can

739

guide

THE EMERGING JUDICIAL CONSENSUS

Two Requirements

The Krinsky, Cahill, and Dendrite standards overlap in two areas that are critical
for cyber-SLAPP defendants who wish to remain anonymous; all three courts would
require the plaintiff to make a prima facie case and to give notice to the defendant before
the courts would allow the plaintiff to determine the defendant's identity through
discovery.253 The requirement that the plaintiff make a prima facie case is essential to
protecting the defendant from the dangers of SLAPPs, because it "ensures that the
plaintiff is not merely seeking to harass or embarrass the speaker or stifle legitimate
criticism."254 In the context of a cyber-SLAPP, where the allegedly tortious statement is
posted on the Internet, this requirement does not pose an undue burden on the plaintiff
because "[the] plaintiff knows the statement that was made and [can] produce[] evidence
of its falsity and the effect it had on her."2 55
While the Krinsky court rejected 256 the Dendrite court's requirement that the
plaintiff notify the defendant that his identifying information has been subpoenaed,
Dendrite and Cahill both require that the plaintiff notify the defendant of the pending
subpoena.257 This point is sometimes rendered moot; if the ISP has taken it upon itself to
notify its customers of the pending subpoena, there is no need to require the plaintiff to
notify the defendant.258 Whether it is the plaintiff or the ISP that notifies the defendant,
and whether it is the courts or the legislature that imposes the requirement, the
defendant's opportunity to receive notice of the subpoena and the chance to respond
effectively defines the scope of the defendant's right to anonymous online speech.
Several Oklahoma ISPs have been proactive in this area by notifying their customers of
pending subpoenas,259 but others have not.260 With no law that requires an ISP to notify
252. Id. at 1172.
253. Id.; Doe v. Cahill, 884 A.2d 451, 457 (Del. 2005); Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe No. 3, 775 A.2d 756, 769
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
254. Krinsky, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 1171.
255. Id. at 1172.
256. See id. at 1171 (in Krinsky, notification by the plaintiff was a moot point because the defendant had
already been notified of the pending subpoena by his ISP).
257. Cahill,884 A.2d at 461; Dendrite, 775 A.2d at 760.
258. See Krinsky, 159 Cal. App. 4th at 1171 (where the defendant's ISP notified him of the subpoena);
Cahill, 884 A.2d at 461 (where the defendant's ISP notified him of the subpoena due to federal law in place at
the time); Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (W.D. Wash. 2001) (where the defendant's
ISP notified him of the subpoena).
259. See AOL Civil Subpoena Policy, AOL LEGAL, http://legal.web.aol.com/aol/aolpol/civilsubpoena.html
(last visited Nov. 28, 2010); EarthLink Civil Subpoena Policy, EARTHLINK (Sep. 23, 2008),
http://www.earthlink.net/about/policies/civil.faces (last visited Nov. 28, 2010); MegaPathSubpoena Response
Policy, MEGAPATH, INc., http://www.megapath.com/pdfs/subpoena policy.pdf (last visited Nov. 28, 2010);
PeoplePC
Civil
Subpoena
Policy,
PEOPLEPC
ONLINE
(July
1,
2009),
http://www.peoplepc.com/about/index.faces?popupld=privacy (last visited Nov. 28, 2010).
260. See
AT&T
Privacy
Policy,
AT&T,
http://www.att.com/Common/about us/privacy policy/print policy.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2010); Hughes
SubscriberPrivacy Policy, HUGHESNET.COM (Oct. 1, 2008), http://legal.hughesnet.com/SubscriberPolicies.cfm
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its customers of civil subpoenas261 and no judicial standard that requires the plaintiff to
do so, an Oklahoma defendant's right to anonymous online speech goes only so far as
the privacy policy of his ISP, in that the ISP may or may not identify the defendant
without his knowledge. 262
B.

The ISP's Effect on the Right to Anonymous Speech

A brief survey of the privacy policies of a few of Oklahoma's ISPs shows how the
identifying information of Oklahoma residents is subject to different standards for
disclosure pursuant to a civil subpoena, depending on who provides their Internet
service. For example, Cox Communications' ("Cox") privacy policy states that it
"reserve[s] the right to disclose Your Information ... [that] is necessary to ... comply

with the law." 263 It further states that Cox "[cannot] assume any duty to notify [its
customers] of receipt of any legal requests." 2 64
Similarly, AT&T's privacy policy states that it may "provide Personal Information
to . . . third parties . . . without your consent . . . [to comply with court orders,

subpoenas, lawful discovery requests and other legal or regulatory requirements." 265
AT&T's policy makes no mention of giving its customers notice that their identifying
information was subpoenaed, with the single exception that when the information was
"collected from AT&T U-verse TV subscribers as a result of the subscriber's use of
AT&T's U-verse TV service," AT&T will provide "prior notice to the subscriber." 266
Presumably, this exception would not apply to an AT&T customer who only uses the
company as an ISP and does not subscribe to its TV service.
NetZero and Juno give themselves broad latitude for disclosing their customers
identifying information.267 NetZero's policy states that it may, "without notice" share
your personal information "to law enforcement or government agencies in response to
subpoenas, court orders, or other legal process (including civil and criminal) or otherwise
as required by law" without making any mention of notifying its customers of the
existence of a order, or giving them the opportunity to respond before complying. 268
Juno's policy is simply to share an individual's "personal Identifier Information" when
such information is "required or requested by law, regulation or order authority." 26 9 Like

(last visited Nov. 28, 2010); Legal: Subscriber Privacy Policy, WILDBLUE (July 11, 2005),
http://get.wildblue.com/privacy-policy.html (last visited Nov. 28, 2010); Privacy Policy, NETZERO (Mar. 19,
2012), http://www.netzero.net/start/landing.do?page=www/legal/privacy (last visited Mar. 31, 2012); Privacy
Statement for Juno Members, JUNO, http://www.juno.com/start/landing.do?page-www/legal/privacy (last
visited Nov. 28, 2010); Your Privacy Rights as a Cox Customer and Related Information, COX (Nov. 18,
2011), http://ww2.cox.com/aboutus/tulsa/policies/annual-privacy-notice.cox#law (last visited Mar. 31, 2012).
261. Federal law may prevent an ISP from notifying its customer of a subpoena when the subpoena is sought
by a government entity. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(b)(1)(A) (West 2009) (allowing governmental entities to
obtain subscriber information from ISPs without notice to the subscriber, provided certain conditions are met).
262. See supra notes 259-60.
263. Your Privacy Rights as a Cox Customer and RelatedInformation, supra note 260.
264. Id.
265. AT&TPrivacy Policy,supra note 260.
266. Id.
267. See Privacy Policy, supranote 260; PrivacyStatementfor Juno Members, supra note 260.
268. Privacy Policy, supra note 260.
269. Privacy Statementfor Juno Members, supra note 260.

https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol47/iss3/9

20

Kilian: In Defense of Anonymous Online Speech in Oklahoma
2012

IN DEFENSE OF ANONYMOUS ONLINE SPEECHIN OKLAHOMA

741

NetZero, Juno's policy makes no mention of notifying its customers of the existence of
the subpoena or giving them the opportunity to respond. 270
On the other hand, EarthLink's Civil Subpoena policy gives customers notice and
the opportunity to respond to a civil subpoena before EarthLink discloses the customer's
identifying information.271 According to the policy, before EarthLink responds to a civil
subpoena it will "notify the customer of the civil request for their information."272
Further, EarthLink gives its customers a chance to respond to the subpoena by providing
that, "[i]n non-emergency situations, EarthLink will generally respond after
approximately fifteen ... days, unless the customer presents EarthLink with notice of
having filed a motion to quash the subpoena or having sought similar protection from a
court." 273
Like EarthLink, America Online's ("AOL") Civil Subpoena Policy gives its
customers notice of a civil subpoena and the opportunity to respond. Under the policy,
when AOL receives a subpoena seeking identifying information, it "promptly send[s]
notification to the account holder whose information is sought." 274 The policy further
states that AOL will not provide the requested information for approximately ten days
after notification, "so that the account holder whose information is sought will have
adequate opportunity to take legal action."275 Similar to EarthLink and AOL, MegaPath
has a Subpoena Response Policy that also gives its customers "notice of the subpoena's
existence to allow the customer the opportunity to quash the subpoena." 2 76
A resident of Tulsa or Oklahoma City may be able to choose from any of the ISPs
above, but some rural areas are underserved or unserved.277 For some rural areas, the
best option for Internet access may be through a satellite ISP, like HughesNet and
WildBlue. 2 78 HughesNet's Subscriber Privacy Policy states that it may "use or disclose
information about you, including your Personal Information, ... [i]n response to a
subpoena, court order, or other legal process," with no provision for notice or an
opportunity to respond.279 While WildBlue's policy states that it will "make every
reasonable effort to protect subscriber privacy," there is no guarantee in the policy that
its reasonable efforts include giving customers notice and the opportunity to respond. 2 80
The result of having an inadequate anti-SLAPP statute is that the scopes of
Oklahoma Internet users' First Amendment rights to anonymous online speech vary

270. Id.
271. EarthLink Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note 259.
272. Id.
273. Id.; see also PeoplePC Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note 259 (People PC, which is a subsidiary of
EarthLink, has the same policy).
274. AOL Civil Subpoena Policy,supra note 259.
275. Id.
276. MegaPathSubpoena Response Policy,supra note 259.
277. See Press Release, State of Oklahoma, Oklahoma Broadband Mapping Initiative Seeks Oklahomans
Assistance
at
http://BroadbandMapping.OK.gov
(June
23,
2010),
available
at
http://www.ok.gov/about/Media Center/Press/2010Oklahoma Broadband Mapping Initiative Seeks Oklahomans Assistance.html.
278. See Special to the E-E, WildBlue Satellite Internet Available, EXAMINER-ENTERPRISE (Mar. 17, 2007,
11:02 PM) (on file with author).
279. Hughes SubscriberPrivacy Policy, supra note 260.
280. See Legal: SubscriberPrivacy Policy, supranote 260.
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widely depending on which company provides their service. 2 81 While the lack of
Oklahoma cases may indicate that this right is not often invoked, that fact does not
diminish the right's importance. 2 82
Many Oklahomans post anonymous reviews of businesses on websites, but they
might not realize that their words could cause them to be unmasked and sued.283 In
Chicago, a doctor sued a former patient over anonymous criticisms she posted on
Yelp.com and Citysearch.com. 2 84 If the patient was an Oklahoman, his right to remain
anonymous could depend on his choice of ISP, which could also depend on where he
happens to live. A Tulsa defendant who uses EarthLink would have the opportunity to
ask a court to quash a subpoena to his ISP seeking identifying information because his
ISP would notify him of the subpoena.285 Oklahoma City defendants who use Cox 286
and rural defendants who use a satellite provider do not have guarantees from their ISPs
that they will be notified of a subpoena. 287 This disparity effectively creates different
levels of rights to anonymous online speech and is impermissible under a Virginia law
that deserves consideration by the Oklahoma legislature. 288
C.

The Consensus Codified

Virginia Code Annotated section 8.01-407.1 was passed in 2002289 and it
"[provides] a procedure governing certain subpoenas in civil proceedings where it is
alleged that an anonymous individual has engaged in tortious Internet
communications."290 Under the statute, a plaintiff seeking to identify an anonymous
defendant via a subpoena to the defendant's ISP must first file evidentiary material with
the court that shows that the plaintiff has a "legitimate, good faith basis" to believe the
communication was tortious.291 A copy of the evidentiary material and the subpoena
must be sent to the defendant's ISP, 2 92 which must attempt to notify the defendant of the
subpoena within five days of receipt, by both email and at his last known address.293 The
statute allows "any interested person [to] file a detailed written objection, motion to

281. See Your Privacy Rights as a Cox Customer and Related Information, supra note 260 (noting Cox does
not assume the duty to notify customers of any legal requests). But see AOL Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note
259 (stating AOL notifies customers of pending legal requests).
282. See McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 342 (stating "[w]hatever the motivation may
be, at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in having anonymous works enter the marketplace of
ideas unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure as a condition of entry").
283. See Mark Saxenmeyer, Chicago Doctor Sues Patients Over Yelp, Citysearch Reviews, Fox CHICAGO
NEWS (Nov. 15, 2010, 9:44 AM), http://www.myfoxchicago.com/dpp/news/investigative/dr-jay-pensler-yelpcitysearch-reviews-20101115 (updated Nov. 16, 2010, 6:45 AM).
284. Id.
285. See EarthLink Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note 259; AOL Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note 259.
286. See Your Privacy Rights as a Cox Customer and Related Information, supra note 260.
287. See Hughes Subscriber Privacy Policy, supra note 260; Legal: Subscriber Privacy Policy, supra note
260.
288. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2010).
289. Id.
290. VA B. Summ., 2002 H.B. 819.
291. § 8.01-407.1.
292. Id.
293. Id.
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quash, or motion for protective order" 294 which states reasons for "denying the
disclosure sought in the subpoena."295 The filing of such an objection, motion to quash,
or motion for protective order prevents the defendant's ISP from complying with the
subpoena until the court rules on the objection or motion.296
Although the statute's good faith standard is a lower standard than the Krinsky,
Cahill, and Dendrite prima facie case requirement, 297 the statute expressly adopts the
Krinsky, Cahill, and Dendrite requirement of notice of the subpoena and the opportunity
to respond.298 A codification of these two principles will enable Oklahoma to avoid the
chilling effects of cyber-SLAPP suits by giving defendants the tools to preserve their
anonymity. Perhaps most importantly, codifying these two principles also ends the
disparity between different Oklahomans' rights to anonymous online speech. 29 9
Oklahoma recently launched the Oklahoma Broadband Initiative, whose goal is to
expand access to broadband services throughout the state. 300 With it, the state recognizes
that "[a]ccess to technology for the provision of enhanced education, healthcare and
emergency services plus job growth and development, have long been identified as one
of the most essential tools a community must have to expand its economic potential and
community livability." 30 1 Access to technology is also an essential tool that an
individual must have to exercise his right to free speech. 302 In order to allow
Oklahomans to fully exercise that right, the Oklahoma legislature should enact a statute
that embodies the principles deduced by the Krinsky, Cahill, and Dendrite courts and
codified by the state of Virginia. 303
V.

CONCLUSION

Cyber-SLAPP suits that are filed in order to unmask anonymous defendants and
chill the right to free speech are antithetical to Oklahoma values. Anonymous speech has
a long history of use throughout the country. 304 The Supreme Court has long recognized
that the right to anonymous speech is protected under the First Amendment, 305 as is the
right to online speech.306 The ever-increasing prevalence of Internet use brings the
potential for increasing infringements on online rights. This potential came to fruition in

294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. See supra note 253 and accompanying text (explaining the Krinsky, Cahill, and Dendrite prima facie
case requirement).
298. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
299. See supra notes 263-81 and accompanying text (explaining how different privacy policies effectively
create different levels of rights to anonymous online speech).
300. About the Oklahoma Broadband Initiative, ST. OKLAHOMA, http://www.ok.gov/broadband/ (last visited
Nov. 28, 2010).
301. Id.
302. See Jack M. Balkin, The Future ofFree Expression in a DigitalAge, 36 PEPP. L. REv. 427, 427 (2009).
303. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text (explaining the two principles deduced by the Krinsky,
Cahill, and Dendrite courts); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2010).

304. See Maggs, supra note 42.
305. See Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections
Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
306. See supra notes 89-100 and accompanying text.
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the line of cases from seescandy.com to Krinsky, which pitted the defendant's right to
anonymous speech against the plaintiff s interest in obtaining relief for allegedly tortious
statements.307 As courts decided these cases, a judicial consensus emerged that strikes a
balance between both parties' interests by recognizing two important principles: before
an anonymous defendant can be unmasked, a plaintiff must show a firm basis for his
allegations and the defendant must be provided with the opportunity to respond to a
subpoena seeking his identifying information.308
Current Oklahoma law does not provide protection for cyber-SLAPP defendants.
In the absence of a statute that defines procedures for handling civil subpoenas seeking
to identify anonymous online speakers, an anonymous Oklahoma defendant can be
identified at the discretion of his ISP. 309 While some ISPs voluntarily notify their
customers when a third party seeks to identify them, others are not willing to assume that
duty. 3 10 The variance among the policies of different ISPs creates an inequality among
Oklahomans' rights to anonymous online speech.
As Oklahoma moves to increase Internet access throughout the state, it should also
move to increase online rights. By forcing the plaintiff to show that his case has merit
and by giving the defendant the opportunity to object to a request for his identity before
his identity is exposed, Virginia avoids the chilling effects of cyber-SLAPP suits and
ensures that its Internet users enjoy the full extent of their First Amendment rights. 3 11
The Oklahoma legislature should follow Virginia's lead and enact a statute that affords
Oklahomans the same protections.
-Sean

Kilian

307. See supra Part IlI.C.
308. See supra Part IV.A.
309. See supra Part IV.B.
310. See AOL Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note 259; EarthLink Civil Subpoena Policy, supra note 259. But
see Your Privacy Rights as a Cox Customer and RelatedInformation, supra note 260.
311. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-407.1 (2010).
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